Given the secrecy and confidentiality that shroud the topic and the lack of existing studies, the conclusions of this piece are to be considered tentative. Consequently, also in the French case, it is ambiguous how the entities complement each other in practice, and how the desired organizational collaboration will achieve impact. The Norwegian organization of cyber capabilities is founded on a centralized model that dissolves the organizational distinction between military and intelligence entities. hkkH|d~HRhmUdc+llb7,B4sn3s9c%LidC309O/Im-^#Zl# Fourth, in the US context, we have seen continuous debate about the dual-hat arrangement concerning the NSA and the US Cyber Command (Chesney Citation2020; Demchak Citation2021), and Lindsay (Citation2021) has recently examined and criticized the organization of the US Cyber Command. The vision is anchored on a three-pronged approach of readiness, capability and capacity, and spans all aviation-related platforms and weapons. << It improves operational effectiveness and provides a mechanism to enhance integration and resource development. While future platforms are designed with cybersecurity in mind, the current fleet of military aircraft was not always, and may be vulnerable to cyberattacks << An official website of the United States government, Department of the Navy Cyberspace Superiority Vision, Climate Action 2030 Department of the Navy, VA Vet Center (Supports vets, service members, and their families), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, One Navy-Marine Corps Team: Strategic Guidance from the Secretary of the Navy, eport to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2022, After compiling and analyzing feedback from hundreds of Sailors through focus groups and surveys, Task Force One Navyin early 2021 submitted its final report, Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, Prepared by: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, SECNAV Stem to Stern Comprehensive Review, Comprehensive Review of the DON Uniformed Legal Communities, Department of the Navy Strategic Guidance FY 2020, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of the Navy's New Education Initiatives, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority (Version 2.0), Navy Leader Development Framework (Version 3.0), Readiness Reform Oversight Committee: One Year Later, Naval Research and Development: A Framework for Accelerating to the Navy and Marine Corps after Next, Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) Addendum to the Naval Research and Development Framework, US Fleet Cyber Command/ Tenth Fleet Strategic Plan 2015-2020, New Navy Cryptologic & Cyber Warfare Community Vision Released, SECNAV Cybersecurity Readiness Review Letter, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal 2020, Laying the Keel: Developing the Backbone of Our Navy, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at JFK Christening, REMARKS - Acting SECNAV at Navy Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce, The President's Coronavirus Guidelines for America, US Navy Hospital Ship Leadership Biographies, Frequently asked questions about USNS Mercy, Frequently asked questions about USNS Comfort deployment to New York City, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil. b(+fb`\BA130s@kvv[ ^ These are protection, military action, intelligence, and judicial investigation (Secrtariat gnral de la dfense et de la scurit nationale Citation2018, 56). Moreover, it spurs the risk that the operational capability and activity of intelligence and military entities are mismatched with the broader strategic or governance goals. They argue that strategic outcomes in, through and from cyberspace are possible short of war (Michael and Harknett Citation2020, 1). You are not required to obtain permission to reuse this article in part or whole. Author (s): Pernik, Piret. Fri: 10:00 - 15:30, NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2020, NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2019. PB2022 provides planned funding to procure ships included in FY2022. United States Navy > Resources > Strategic Library Architecting Cyber Defense: A Survey of the Leading Cyber Reference The specifics of leader development will be shaped by community leaders to be consistent with this Framework, but the fundamental concepts discussed in this Framework apply to the entire Navy Team. This article advances this debate by undertaking a comparative analysis of how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities. The arrangement will allow NATO and Finland to better protect and improve the resilience of their networks. While the collaboration between ANSSI, COMCYBER, and the French intelligence services is hence likely to increase, neither the desired outcome of the collaboration nor its strategic and practical dimensions are explicated. Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, Prepared by: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instead, the Norwegian military and civilian foreign intelligence service (E-tjenesten) is responsible for intelligence operations, offensive cyber operations, and for coordinating between offensive and defensive cyber operations. The aim of this strategy is to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic. The Ministry of Defense (ibid) stresses that it will further develop the Intelligence Services ability to counter threats before incidents occur and emphasize that that cooperation and coordination between the above-mentioned actors in military cyber operations [the intelligence service and the FOH] will be strengthened, based on a military cyber operations center in the Intelligence Service. This strategy establishes objectives to meet this aim and support national policy. 138 0 obj <>stream The deliberate design and standup of this command came at a good time in history. Remarks by the Hon. This article provides a first step in closing that gap by offering a dedicated perspective on the organization of offensive cyber capabilities across three European countries. US Navy 3D printing entire fleet from UAVs, and submarines to - IDST Norway has kept with this model in order to foster synergies and reduce the costs of developing and deploying cyber capabilities. >> /Resources 12 0 R The Norwegian Ministry of Defense (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2019a, 19) describes it in the following way: The responsibility for network intelligence operations and offensive cyberoperations are with the Intelligence Service. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. . Full article: Organizing cyber capability across military and Cyberwarfare: Artificial Intelligence in The Frontlines of Combat /Font 55 0 R 18 . This has arguably led to overly militarized approaches to cyber security (Burton and Christou Citation2021, 1732). Nurturing such debate is crucial to achieve the best decisions about how to organize and develop cyber capabilities, how to use it, and how to secure transparency and accountability. Aerial drones are increasingly being repurposed for domestic use and legislated for public and commercial purposes around the world. This would, inter alia, lead to the creation of a duplication of capabilities, resulting in an unclear distinction between offensive cyber operations inside and outside military operations. In 2018, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2018, 8) explained, in an investment plan accepted by the government, that. endobj /MediaBox [0.0 0.0 612.0 792.0] They ultimately broke into fewer than 100 choice networksincluding those of Fortune 500 companies like Microsoft and the US Justice Department, State Department, and NASA (Newman Citation2021). The exploratory nature of the study ensures an empirical sensitivity in line with understanding cybersecurity as a situated and contextual object of study, rather than being predetermined by the existing theories and categories (Liebetrau and Christensen Citation2021). The Maritime Security Cooperation Policy renews our focus on preventing war, operating forward in new and flexible ways, and being postured to prevail should conflict arise. Official Texts - Cyber Defence - NATO Library at NATO Library This rise is arguably fueled by the dramatic increase in ransomware payments. endobj 5 0 obj In this context, the DCCFootnote5, sees offensive cyber capabilities as digital resources the purpose of which is to influence or pre-empt the actions of an opponent by infiltrating computers, computer networks and weapons and sensor systems so as to influence information and systems. The United States is an Arctic nation1 through the state of Alaska and its surrounding territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone waters located in and around the Arctic Circle.
